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THELAMEDUCKSOFMARBURY 
John Copeland Nagle* 
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams had not been the best of 
friends before the election of 1800, and their competition for the 
presidency gave them ample occasion to ponder each other's 
faults. Yet it was easy for Jefferson to identify the single incident 
that troubled him most. As he wrote to Abigail Adams in 1804: 
I can say with truth that one act of Mr. Adams' life, and one 
only, ever gave me a moment's personal displeasure. I did 
consider his last appointments to office as personally unkind. 
They were from among my most ardent political enemies, 
from whom no faithful cooperation could ever be expected, 
and laid me under the embarrassment of acting thro' men 
whose views were to defeat mine; or to encounter the odium 
of putting others in their places. It seemed but common jus-
tice to leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own 
choice.' 
Jefferson, alas, was denied such kindness and common justice, 
and it was his attempt to achieve it that produced Marbury v. 
Madison. 2 
The constitutional flaw that gave rise to Marbury persists 
even as we celebrate the decision's two hundredth birthday. 
Marbury established a principle of judicial review which courts 
have applied without hesitation ever since then.3 Marbury-that 
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to the University of Minne-
sota for affording me the opportunity to participate in this birthday party. Dinah 
Sampson provided excellent research assistance. 
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, in 1 THE 
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LEITERS 270 (Lester Cappon ed., 1959).Jefferson added that "after 
brooding over it for some little time ... I forgave it cordially, and returned to the same 
state of esteem and respect for him which had so long subsisted." /d. at 270-71. 
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3. Academics are another story. As then-Professor McConnell testified at his re-
cent judicial confirmation hearing, "In my line of work, we're still arguing about Marbury 
v. Madison." See Jonathan Groner, Law Scholars Lift McConnell's Chances: Professors 
Rally Around One of Their Own, Muting Liberal Opposition to Outspoken lOth Circuit 
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318 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:317 
is, William Marbury, the erstwhile justice of the peace and un-
successful plaintiff-suffered a different fate. On his next to last 
day in office, President Adams selected Marbury to serve in an 
office that Congress had created only three days before. The 
Senate quickly gave its consent and Secretary of State John Mar-
shall sealed the commission, but Marshall neglected to deliver 
the commission before the clock tolled midnight on March 3, 
thus ending the Adams Administration. Marbury was legally en-
titled to his office, said Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury, 
but the statute by which Marbury asked the Court to act was un-
constitutional. Marbury lost, but Marbury lived on. 
None of this would have happened, of course, if President 
Adams and his Federalist Party allies in Congress had not been 
in such a hurry to create and populate an expanded federal judi-
ciary. And Adams and the Federalists would not have been in 
such a hurry if Adams had been reelected in 1800. But Jefferson 
and the dreaded Republicans were the victors, and they were 
poised to take office on March 4, 1801. The months between the 
election and the inauguration-the so-called "lame duck" pe-
riod-thus provided the last opportunity for the Federalists to 
exercise the authority of the government of the United States. 
They made the most of the opportunity. In the understated 
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "The lame-duck Congress ... 
proceeded to use its political power with considerable aban-
don."4 Between December 1800 and March 3, 1801, President 
Adams and the Federalist majority in Congress enacted sweep-
ing legislation, approved treaties, appointed a new Chief Justice 
and dozens of other judges to the federal judiciary, and nearly 
succeeded in anointing Aaron Burr as President instead of Tho-
mas Jefferson. The incoming Republicans were not amused, but 
the Constitution left them helpless.5 
Nearly 150 years passed before the Constitution was 
amended in an effort to solve the lame duck problem. Pursuant 
Nominee, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at 8 (quoting McConnell). The path by which 
Chief Justice Marshall decided Marbury elicits the greatest skepticism, as many of the 
other papers in this symposium demonstrate. 
4. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS 
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 49 (1992). 
5. The best histories of this episode are GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. 
JOHNSON, 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15 
(1981), and DONALD 0. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND OF MARBURY V. MADISON (1970). Professor Haskins wrote the part of 
volume two of the Oliver Wendall Holmes Devise History that addresses the issues re-
lated to Marbury. 
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to the twentieth amendment, the newly-elected President now 
takes office on January 20 instead of March 4, and the new Con-
gress begins on January 3 instead of when. The proponents of 
the twentieth amendment believed that they had solved the lame 
duck problem once and for all. But they were wrong. Lame duck 
Presidents and Congresses have been busy enacting legislation, 
promulgating regulations, approving treaties, pardoning crimi-
nals, and appointing judges and other officials. Their state execu-
tive and legislative counterparts do much the same thing. 
This persists despite the early recognition that actions by 
lame ducks present serious questions of democratic theory. Ech-
oes of those concerns sounded during the push to approve the 
twentieth amendment during the 1920's and early 1930's. Most 
recently, academics have responded to perceived abuses by lame 
duck Presidents by proposing restrictions on the President's 
powers during the lame duck period. I will join those calls in this 
essay, hoping that we can learn the lesson of Marbury's ap-
pointment just as we have accepted Marbury. It is time to heed 
Jefferson's plea for "common justice to leave a successor free to 
act by instruments of his own choice. "6 
I. THE EVENTS OF THE LAME DUCK PERIOD OF 1800 
TO 1801 
A. THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
The timing of the actions of the lame duck President Adams 
and the Federalist-controlled Congress in 1800 and 1801 speaks 
for itself: 
November 17 The second session of the Sixth Congress began 
December 15 Adams learned of the resignation of Chief Jus-
tice Oliver Ellsworth 
December 18 Adams nominated John Jay to serve as Chief 
Justice 
December 19 The Senate confirmed John Jay to serve as 
Chief Justice 
January 2 Jay wrote to Adams declining to serve as Chief 
Justice 
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, supra note 1. 
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January 20 Adams nominated John Marshall to serve as 
Chief Justice 
House passed the Judiciary Act 
January 23 Senate rejected the Treaty with France 
January 27 Senate confirmed Marshall as Chief Justice 
February 3 Senate ratified the Trea!Y_ with France 
February 4 Marshall took the oath of office as Chief Justice 
February 5 Senate passed the District of Columbia courts 
act 
February 11 Senate passed the Judicial}' Act 
February 13 Adams signed the Judiciary Act 
February 17 House elected Thomas Jefferson as President 
February 18 Adams submitted nominations for most of the 
circuit judges to fill the positions created by the 
Judiciary Act 
February 20 Senate confirmed the judges nominated two 
days before 
February 23 Adams submitted nominations for five addi-
tional circuit judges and other offices created 
by the Judiciary Act 
February 24 Senate confirmed the judges nominated the day 
before House passed the District of Columbia 
courts act 
February 25 Adams submitted nominations for two addi-
tional circuit judges created by the Judiciary 
Act 
February 26 Senate confirmed the judges nominated the day 
before 
February 27 Adams signed the District of Columbia courts 
act 
February 28 Adams submitted nominations for three judges, 
the district attorney, and the federal marshal 
established by the District of Columbia courts 
act 
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March2 Adams nominated William Marbury and 41 
others to serve as justices of the peace pursuant 
to the District of Columbia courts act 
Senate confirmed the last of the judges nomi-
nated on February 26 
March3 Senate confirmed the appointment of Marbury 
and the others nominated the dav before 
March4 Thomas Jefferson inaugurated as President 
The Federalist Party controlled the presidency and the 
Congress for the first twelve years of government under the new 
Constitution of the United States. George Washington served 
two terms as President, then John Adams took office in 1796. 
The Federalists also controlled the Congress. During that time, 
though, President Washington's leadership covered an increas-
ingly divisive disagreement between Alexander Hamilton and 
Thomas Jefferson concerning the direction of the federal gov-
ernment. Hamilton and his allies came to be known as the Fed-
eralist Party, while Jefferson was the acknowledged leader of the 
Republican Party. The election of 1800 thus presented a stark 
choice regarding the future direction of the young United States. 
But the choice was not simply between the Federalists and Jef-
ferson. John Adams had steered a middle course during his term 
as President, frustrating ardent Federalists and Jeffersonian Re-
publicans alike. Adams remained a Federalist, though, so he and 
Jefferson competed for the presidency in 1800.7 
Jefferson defeated Adams by eight electoral votes-73-65-
making it one of the closest presidential races in American his-
tory. Adams would have prevailed if he had won New York, 
which went for Jefferson by a mere 250 votes.8 Meanwhile, the 
Federalists lost control of Congress as well. By December 12, 
then, it was clear that twelve years of Federalist rule had ended. 
What was not known, of course, is that "[t]he Federalists were 
7. See generally HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 50-73 (summarizing 
American politics at the time of the election of 1800). 
8. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 556 (2001). McCullough notes the 
irony "that Jefferson, the apostle of agrarian America who loathed cities, owed his ulti· 
mate political triumph to New York." !d. Moreover, Jefferson would have lost but for 
the electoral votes he won in the southern states, and those electoral votes were calcu· 
lated by counting each slave as three-fifths of a person in counting the total state popula-
tion. See id. 
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never to regain power in the executive and legislative branches 
after the loss of the election of 1800."9 
Nearly three months remained after Adams learned that he 
would not serve another term until Jefferson would actually suc-
ceed him. Three important events occurred during that lame-
duck period: the Treaty with France was approved, the House of 
Representatives selected Jefferson as President, and the federal 
judiciary was expanded and populated. The latter event receives 
most of the attention when the actions of lame-ducks are cri-
tiqued, but the importance of the first two events should not be 
underestimated. 
1. The Treaty with France 
The Sixth Congress began its lame duck session in Decem-
ber 1800. It did little until January 1801, when the Senate began 
a month of debate concerning the treaty that the Adams admini-
stration had negotiated with France. President Adams had 
named Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and Wil-
liam Vans Murray to negotiate an end to ongoing disputes with 
France, a move that the Senate confirmed in February 1799 
"over High Federalist objections."10 Those negotiations yielded 
an agreement signed at M6rtefontaine in early October 1800. 
The Senate considered the treaty as the first measure of serious 
business during its lame-duck session following the election of 
1800. But "[h]aving lost his bid for reelection, Adams had even 
less influence than usual with the High Federalists," and the 
Senate defeated the treaty 16-14 on January 23, with all of the 
negative votes cast by Federalists.u As Jean Edward Smith ex-
plains: 
The fact is, the party had thrown a temper tantrum- a 
splenetic outburst of resentment against Adams, against 
France, against the impending loss of power that the election 
had made inevitable. Reality dawned quickly. To the discom-
fiture of Federalist senators, the Convention of Mortefontaine 
was extremely popular throughout the country, not only 
among Jefferson's supporters but also with the business com-
munity, which wanted the quasi-war to end so that trade 
could be restored with France. Marshall and others pointed 
out that if the party did not back Adams and adopt the treaty, 
9. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 72. 
10. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 252 n.t 
(1996). 
11. Id. at 278. 
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the incoming Jefferson administration would negotiate a new 
one that they would find even more objectionable. 12 
323 
These arguments persuaded five of the original Senate oppo-
nents of the treaty to change their minds, and the Senate ratified 
the resubmitted treaty 22-9 on February 3. 
2. The selection of Jefferson as President 
The next task for the lame duck Congress was to choose a 
President. Jefferson had received eight more electoral votes than 
Adams, but he had received the same number of votes as Aaron 
Burr-Jefferson's running mate. Everyone knew that Jefferson 
was the presidential candidate and Burr was the candidate for 
Vice President, but the Constitution neglected to account for 
that.13 But "[t]he lame-duck House of Representatives was con-
trolled by the Federalists, and for many of them, Jefferson was 
anathema."14 So the Federalists in the House moved to select 
Burr, not Jefferson, as President- "public sentiment to the con-
trary notwithstanding."15 For thirty-five ballots, the Republicans 
voted for Jefferson and the Federalists voted for Burr, leaving 
Jefferson one state short of the majority that he needed to be 
elected President. Finally, Jefferson prevailed when James 
Bayard, a Federalist from Delaware, abstained from voting for 
Burr on February 17.16 
3. The expansion of the federal judiciary 
President Adams received his first lame duck opportunity to 
shape the future of the federal judiciary in December 1800. 
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth resigned because of ill health,17 
and John Jay declined Adams' nomination to reprise in that po-
sition. So Adams turned to John Marshall, who had been serving 
as his Secretary of State. Marshall was ready, willing, and able, 
and "Adams simply could not afford to delay naming a Chief 
Justice if the Federalists were to retain control of the Court. "18 
12. /d. 
13. A constitutional amendment soon remedied that problem. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XII (1804). 
14. SMITH, supra note 10, at 10. 
15. /d. 
16. For an account of Jefferson's election from Bayard's perspective, see MORTON 
BORDEN, THE FEDERALISM OF JAMES A. BAYARD 88-95 (1955). 
17. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 103 n.158 (noting that Adams re-
ceived the resignation letter on December 15, 1800). 
18. SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. 
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The Federalists in the Senate were less than impressed by the 
choice, for they viewed Marshall as insufficiently committed to 
Hamiltonian principles. Indeed, one Federalist Senator reported 
"that Marshall's nomination was greeted 'with grief, astonish-
ment, and almost indignation."'19 Adams, however, refused to 
budge during a week of Federalist pleas to choose a more ac-
ceptable candidate. Then the Federalists recognized that the al-
ternative to Marshall was leaving the seat vacant for President 
Jefferson to fill. The Senate unanimously confirmed Marshall on 
J anuarfo 27, with the Republicans supporting Marshall enthusias-
tically. 0 
Meanwhile, the lame duck Congress that began meeting in 
December enacted 37 statutes before it adjourned on March 3, 
with most of them addressing minor issues that generated little 
controversy.Z1 Two of those statutes stand out. In the middle of 
December 1800, Jefferson wrote James Madison that Congress 
would not act on a judiciary bill during the lame duck session be-
cause the judicial appointments "could not fall on those that cre-
ate them."22 At the time, the federal judiciary consisted of just 
twelve men: the six Justices of the Supreme Court and six circuit 
judges. Congress had considered numerous reform proposals 
since the early 1790's. Most recently, the House had narrowly 
defeated a federal judiciary bill in the spring of 1800, but it failed 
to heed the pleas of its supporters-including John Marshall, 
who was then serving on the House Judiciary Committee- and 
the issue remained unresolved before the election.Z3 But contrary 
to Jefferson's confidence, the election prompted the Federalists 
in Congress to return to the future of the federal judiciary with a 
new urgency. The bill developed by Congress greatly expanded 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It relieved the Supreme 
Court Justices from the duty to ride on circuit to hear cases 
throughout the country, and it reduced the number of Justices 
from six to five in a transparent move to deny Jefferson an ap-
19. /d. (quoting New Jersey Senator Jonathan Dayton). Professor Dewey explains 
that "Marshall's greatest affront to pure Federalism came during his congressional cam-
paign of 1799 when he criticized the Alien and Sedition Acts." DEWEY, supra note 5, at 
9. 
20. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. Professor Dewey is somewhat more cautious, 
characterizing the Republicans as "indifferent to Marshall's appointment." DEWEY, su-
pra note 5, at 13. 
21. See generally 2 Stat. 88-127 (recording each of the statutes). 
22. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 19, 1800, in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 159 (P.L. Forded., 1904-05). 
23. See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & 
MARY Q. 3, 9-14 (1965). 
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pointment once the next justice retired. The bill also created six-
teen new federal circuit judgeships, along with numerous atten-
dant clerks, United States marshals, and United States attorneys. 
The House approved the bill 51-43 on the same day that the 
Senate confirmed John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice. 
A little over two weeks later, on February 11, the Senate con-
curred 16-11. No Republicans voted for the bill.24 George Ma-
son, a Republican Senator from Virginia, complained that the 
bill "has been crammed down our throats without a word or let-
ter being suffered to be altered. "25 
President Adams immediately set out to fill the positions 
created by the new law. He was assisted by John Marshall (now 
serving as both Chief Justice and Secretary of State), innumer-
able Federalist partisans, and prospective officeholders them-
selves. Adams nominated the first judges on February 18, five 
days after he had signed the law that created the judgeships.26 
The rest of the appointments soon followed. As noted by 
Jeremiah Smith, a successful candidate for a federal judgship in 
New Hampshire, "There is something awkward in applying ... 
for an office before it is created. "27 Jefferson and the Republi-
cans complained about the rush to fill the judiciary with Federal-
ists. But the Republicans in the Senate affirmatively opposed 
only one judicial nomination. Philip Barton Key had lost his seat 
in the Maryland state legislature in the election of 1800, so 
President Adams selected him to fill a new judgeship on the 
Fourth Circuit. Key, however, had fought as a Loyalist and 
briefly returned to England after the Revolutionary War. Nine 
Republican Senators unsuccessfully opposed his appointment to 
the court.28 
Just over two weeks remained. Adams continued to submit 
nominations to the Senate, filling a total of 106 military positions 
and 18 diplomatic and commercial posts in February 1801, in ad-
24. See An Act to provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of 
the United States, 2 Stat. 89 (1801); 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 915 (1801) (recording the 
House vote). Three Federalists joined all of the Republican members of the House in 
opposing the bill. See Turner, supra note 23, at 19 n.83. 
25. Letter from George Mason to John Breckenridge, Feb. 12, 1801, contained in 
the Breckenridge Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, quoted in HASKINS 
& JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 126 n.82). 
26. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 381-85; Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 
109 U. PA. L. REV. 494,498 (1961). Professor Turner's article offers a detailed account of 
the selection of all of the judges whose positions were created by the Judiciary Act. 
27. Turner, supra note 26, at 497 (quoting a letter from Smith to Senator Jonathan 
Dayton dated Jan. 30, 1801). 
28. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 383; Turner, supra note 26, at 513-14 & n.124. 
326 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 20:317 
dition to the judgeships established by the Judiciary Act.29 Then, 
on February 27, Congress passed the innocently-titled "Act con-
cerning the District of Columbia."30 Washington had become the 
nation's capital in 1800 when the government moved from 
Philadelphia.31 Accordingly, the February 27 statute created 
three more judges, and authorized the appointment of an inde-
terminate number of clerks, United States Marshals, and United 
States Attorneys, and "such number of discreet persons to be 
justices of the peace as the President of the United States shall 
from time to time think expedient."32 Acting quickly, Adams 
moved to fill the new positions, failing only once when his nomi-
nee declined to serve due to poor health.33 He appointed the 
three new judges established by the District of Columbia courts 
act.34 He also appointed 53 individuals to other positions estab-
lished by that act, including William Marbury, who was chosen 
to serve a five year term as a justice of the peace.35 The Senate 
approved all of the nominations on March 3, including a final 
meeting that began at six o'clock on that evening.36 The commis-
sions were sent to the Secretary of State-John Marshall-who 
quickly affixed the seal of the United States and moved to de-
liver them to the new appointees. But, according to Jeffersonian 
legend, Marshall had not completed the task when Levi Lin-
coln-Jefferson's choice as Attorney General-walked into 
Marshall's office holding Jefferson's watch at midnight.37 Mar-
bury's commission was one of several that had been sealed but 
not delivered. Jefferson declined to allow Marbury to take of-
fice, so Marbury sued in the Supreme Court. He lost. 
29. See DEWEY, supra note 5, at 55. 
30. An Act concerning the District of Columbia, 2 Stat. 103 (1801) [hereinafter Dis-
trict of Columbia Courts Act]. 
31. On November 1, 1800, John Adams became the first President to occupy the 
White House. See McCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 551. 
32. District of Columbia Courts Act, 2 Stat. 103, § 11. 
33. See Turner, supra note 26, at 517-18. 
34. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 387 (1801). 
35. See SEN. EXEC. J., 18th sess., at 388 (1801) (listing the nomination of "William 
Marberry"); see generally David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and Wil-
liam Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATH. U.L. REv. 349 (1996) (de-
scribing William Marbury's life and career). 
36. See SEN. EXEC. J.,18th sess., at 389-90 (1801). 
37. As Dewey recounts the Jeffersonian legend, Levi Lincoln "stormed in to order 
Marshall to stop immediately. When they quibbled over time, the attorney general deliv-
ered his first legal opinion-to the chief justice, of all people-by ruling that the Presi-
dent's timepiece, which he held in his hand, was the final authority. The humiliated Mar-
shall then supposedly slunk from the office, leaving a pile of commissions on his desk, 
including the ill-fated one for William Marbury." DEWEY, supra note 5, at 58. 
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Marbury was not the only lame-duck appointee to lose his 
position once Jefferson took office. In the words of one biogra-
pher, after the election, and 
[w]ith grim determination, Jefferson set about the tedious 
task of weeding out the "midnight" appointments. He care-
fully defined them as those which had been "made by mr Ad-
ams after Dec. 12. 1800 when the event of the S.C. election 
which decided the Presidential election was known at Wash-
ington and until Midnight of Mar. 3, 1801." These were to be 
"considered as Null."38 
Many of those appointments were to offices within the executive 
branch, and thus within Jefferson's power to remove. Thus Jef-
ferson vowed to "expunge the effects of Mr. A.'s indecent con-
duct, in crowding nominations after he knew they were not for 
himself, till 9 o'clock of the night, at 12. o'clock of which he was 
to go out of office."39 The judicial appointments were protected 
by the life-tenure provision of Article III, but the Republicans 
had a solution for that, too. In 1802, Congress repealed that stat-
ute, largely because of the circumstances of its enactment.40 One 
week after deciding Marbury, the Supreme Court, speaking 
through Justice Paterson, sustained the repeal of the Judiciary 
Act.4t 
B. THE REASONS FOR THE LAME DUCK ACTIONS 
Most of the Jeffersonian and Republican complaints about 
the actions of the lame duck Federalists were based on the proc-
ess, not the merits of the particular decisions. Indeed, the merits 
are eminently defensible, certainly concerning John Marshall's 
appointment as Chief Justice, and even with respect to the ill-
fated Judiciary Act. "Had the appointment of these officers been 
left to Jefferson," one historian concluded, "the Republicans 
would undoubtedly have found little fault with the law. "42 Like-
wise, many of those individuals who were then appointed to the 
38. 2 NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 670-71 (1951) 
(quoting Jefferson). 
39. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush, Mar. 24, 1801, in 9 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 230-31. 
40. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 163-68 (describing the repeal of the 
Judiciary Act of 1801). 
41. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
42. 2 J.B. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 533 
(1885) (quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 108). See also DEWEY, supra 
note 5, at 54 ("The Judiciary Act of 1801 was a commendable piece of legislation though 
abominably timed."). 
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new judgeships and other positions were highly regarded by Re-
publicans at the time and historians since then.43 
But that does not mean that the actions of the lame duck 
Federalists were justified. The people had just elected Jefferson 
as President accompanied by a Republican majority in Congress, 
and the successful candidates rejected the Federalist conception 
of the federal judiciary. Surveying these events with the benefit 
of hindsight, Professor Kathryn Turner concluded that "[t]he 
Judiciary Act of 1801 ... was not conceived in the exigencies of 
defeat to compensate for that catastrophe."44 But it is the timing 
of the law's birth, not its conception, that is so troublesome. The 
compelling reasons for that legislation were equally compelling 
when the same Congress rejected it nearly a year before. The 
haste with which Congress approved a nearly identical statute in 
February 1801 is explained by only one thing. 
Republicans complained that "[i]n all these instances 
[President Adams] named men opposed in political opinion to 
the national will, as unequivocally declared by his removal and 
the appointment of a successor of different sentiments. "45 Adams 
and the Federalists were accused of "pack[ing] the judiciary ... 
without even a feeling of shame that he was appointing men to 
office for life whose principles had just been condemned by the 
people."46 The Philadelphia Aurora proclaimed that the Judici-
ary Act "might with greater propriety be called a bill for provid-
ing sinecure places and pensions for thorough-going Federal par-
tisans."47 John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice failed to 
elicit a similar outrage, perhaps because of genuine Republican 
acceptance of Marshall, or perhaps because they "accept[ed] the 
appointment of a chief justice by a retiring President as one of 
the unfortunate rules of the game of politics."48 But it would 
43. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 131 (concluding that "(a]lthough the 
political character of the appointments requires no documentation, most of them were 
deserving men of proven ability at the Bar or on the bench"); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW 
CROSS KEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
761 (1951) (contending that "Adams chose an extraordinarily able group of men" who 
"will bear comparison with any equal number of judges ever chosen by any President, 
before or since"); Turner, supra note 26, at 519-21 (evaluating the appointments). 
44. Turner, supra note 23, at 32. 
45. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1801, quoted in Turner, supra note 26, at 
519. 
46. L.G. TYLER, PARTIES AND PATRONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 23-24 (1891) 
(quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 109 n.6). 
47. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 55 (quoting the PHILADELPHIA AURORA). 
48. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 13; see also id. at 14 (noting that "Republican and Fed-
eralist newspapers alike virtually ignored Marshall's assumption of office .... perhaps 
because 'sinecure' then seemed a fair description of the office."). 
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have been unthinkable for Thomas Jefferson to appoint his 
archenemy to the Supreme Court.49 
Jefferson was particularly upset with the appointments. As 
noted above, he described the lame duck appointments "as per-
sonally unkind," adding that "[i]t seemed but common justice to 
leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own choice.50 
Again as noted above, he protested "Mr. A.'s indecent conduct, 
in crowding nominations after he knew they were not for him-
self, till 9 o'clock of the night, at 12. o'clock of which he was to 
go out of office. "51 Jefferson also complained that the creation 
and appointment of new judges were the most objectionable ac-
tions of the lame duck Federalists "because appointments in the 
nature of freehold render it difficult to undo what is done. "52 He 
famously complained that the Federalists "have retired into the 
judiciary as a stronghold" from whence "all the works of repub-
licanism are to be beaten down and erased. "53 
The Federalists admitted as much. A desire to save the na-
tion from itself operated as the animating principle throughout 
the lame duck period. Henry Adams later referred to the Feder-
alist effort "to prevent the overthrow of those legal principles in 
which, as they believed, national safety dwelt."54 William Bing-
ham, a Federalist Senator from Pennsylvania, explained that the 
Judiciary Act must be approved quickly because "the federal 
Party wish the appointments to be made under the present ad-
ministration ... the Importance of filling these Seats with federal 
characters must be obvious. "55 Senator Dwight Foster of Massa-
chusetts simply observed that if the Judiciary Act "now passes 
49. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 11·12 (describing the life-long animosity between 
Jefferson and Marshall); DEWEY, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that "John Marshall and 
Thomas Jefferson despised each other"); 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 192 (1930) (describing 
Marshall as "a man as obnoxious to Jefferson as the bitterest New England Calvinist 
could have been"). Indeed, Jefferson's attitude toward Marshall was once characterized 
as "tinged with a deeper feeling, bordering at times on fear." SMITH, supra note 10, at 12 
(quoting Henry Adams). 
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 13, 1804, supra note 1. 
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush, Mar. 24, 1801, in 9 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 230-31. 
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 26, 1800, in THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 161. 
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801, in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Memorial ed., 1902). 
54. 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 275 (1889), 
quoted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 109. 
55. Turner, supra note 26, at 509 (quoting a letter from Bingham to Richard Peters 
dated February 1, 1801). 
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Mr. Adams will have the nomination of the Judges to be ap-
pointed. "56 Another Federalist warned of "scoundrels placed on 
the seat of Justice" once "the ground will be occupied by the en-
emy the very next Session of Congress. "57 Even President Ad-
ams acknowledged the divergence between his views and those 
expressed during the recent election. Responding to Federalists 
who championed judicial candidates who were "an enemy to the 
fatal philosophy of the day, Adams wrote that such a view "has 
great weight with me, although it appears to have none with our 
nation."58 Thus the Judiciary Act was "as good to the party as an 
election. "59 
The good of friends, family, and individual Federalists offers 
an even more banal explanation for these actions. According to 
Professor Turner, several leading Federalists in Congress had 
"purchased lands on a vast scale," and as "their anticipated for-
tunes hung in the balance in 1800 jeopardized by state action," 
the Judiciary Act's expansion of federal court jurisdiction af-
forded them some comfort.60 Moreover, many of the judges and 
other officials appointed by President Adams and confirmed by 
the Senate were relatives of those involved in making the ap-
pointments (and, of course, in creating the offices to which they 
were appointed). "Impervious now to criticism," and casting 
aside his earlier scruples, President Adams appointed his 
nephew, William Cranch, as one of the new judges for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.61 John Marshall's brother James received one 
of the other District of Columbia judgeships.62 William McClung 
was appointed to the new Sixth Circuit judgeship, which un-
doubtedly pleased two of his brothers-in-law: John Marshall and 
56. DEWEY, supra note 5, at 53 (quoting Senator Foster). 
57. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 128 (quoting a letter from J. Gunn to 
Alexander Hamilton dated December 13, 1800). 
58. Turner, supra note 26, at 503 (quoting a letter from Adams to John Rodgers 
dated Feb. 6, 1801). 
59. Turner, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting a Republican's recollection of a Federalist 
boast). 
60. Turner, supra note 23, at 28-29. Professor Turner stresses that "[i]t would be a 
mistake, however, to view the Judiciary Act of 1801 solely in terms of its benefits to the 
speculative interests of Federalist members of Congress." Id. at 29. 
61. Turner, supra note 26, at 517-18. David McCullough describes how Adams, 
when serving as Vice President, rebuffed Mercy Warren's request to arrange for a posi-
tion for her husband because he "could not possibly allow the authority entrusted to him 
to become 'subservient to my private views, or those of my family or friends."' 
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 411. But during the lame duck period of 1801, Adams 
"excercis[ed] his presidential prerogative to fill government positions of all kinds, includ-
ing some for friends and needy relatives. Scruples of the kind he had once preached to 
Mercy Warren concerning such appointments were considered no more." I d. at 563. 
62 See Turner, supra note 26, at 518. 
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Kentucky Senator Humphrey Marshall.63 Keith Taylor, another 
brother-in-law of John Marshall, was appointed as Fourth Cir-
cuit judge.64 The new Third Circuit judge, Richard Bassett, was 
the father-in-law of James Bayard, a leading Federalist member 
of the House.65 Edward St. Loe Livermore, the new federal dis-
trict attorney for New Hampshire, was the son of Senator Sam-
uel Livermore.66 As for friends, the balance of the appointments 
were loyal Federalists, including defeated politicians and a dis-
graced cabinet official. President Adams also appointed four 
members of Congress to newly created positions that had just 
become vacant when their previous occupants were elevated to 
higher offices, a clever but controversial evasion of the constitu-
tional ban on appointing sitting members of Congress to offices 
that they helped to establish.67 
II. LAME DUCKS SINCE MARBURY 
The Federalists of 1801 began an American tradition of ex-
ploiting the lame duck period. The complaints voiced by the Re-
publicans of 1801 have been frequently echoed as well.68 Con-
cerns about legislation approved by lame duck Congresses 
culminated in the enactment of the twentieth amendment in 
1933. Popularly known as "the lame duck amendment," the 
twentieth amendment responded to concerns that governmental 
actions taken by lame ducks are fundamentally undemocratic: 
The supporters of the Twentieth Amendment proclaimed that 
the voice of the people in an election was supreme. That 
proposition demanded that the electoral mandate of the peo-
ple should be put into effect immediately. New members of 
63. !d. at 516-18. 
64. !d. at 513-14. 
65. !d. at 512-13. 
66. !d. at 497-98. 
67. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 6 (providing that "[n]o Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Au-
thority of the United States, which shall have been created ... during such time"); 
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 131-32 & n.l21 (listing the members of Congress 
who were named judges). The argument for the constitutionality of such maneuvers em-
phasized that members of Congress were appointed to positions that had existed before 
the appointee served in Congress. 
68. What happened to lame ducks before 1801 is of keen interest to me, but I have 
yet to pursue the historical research necessary to answer that question. One obvious 
point is that the lame duck period is much shorter under a Parliamentary system in which 
the transition from the defeated government to the victors can take place within a matter 
of days, not months. Still, there were lame ducks before 1801, and their actions are de-
serving of future scrutiny. 
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Congress should take their seats soon after the election. Out-
going members of Congress who lost their bids for reelection 
were characterized as no longer representative of the people 
and no longer entitled to participate in legislative actions. In-
deed, one of the more restrained supporters of the Amend-
ment argued that "for a person to continue to represent a 
constituency after his defeat, is contrary to the whole plan and 
philosophy of a representative system of government. "69 
Additionally, "[l]ame-duck members of Congress suffered from 
perverse incentives. On the one hand, once defeated, members 
were unaccountable to the electorate. On the other hand, outgo-
ing members were viewed as susceptible to pressure from the 
President and from special interests. Many feared that the desire 
to obtain new employment once service in Congress ended-
voluntarily or involuntarily-would influence the votes of an 
outgoing Senator or Representative."70 Ratification of the twen-
tieth amendment was universally expected to end the possibility 
of legislation being enacted by a lame duck Congress.71 
Yet the twentieth amendment failed to achieve its stated 
goal of eliminating all lame duck legislation forever more. By 
1940, a lame duck Congress returned to action, approving new 
statutes with little apparent popular objection. The election of 
1980 yielded the only post-twentieth amendment, Marbury-like 
switch in both the party that controls the presidency and the 
Senate. The lame ducks of 1980 succeeded in enacting legislation 
imposing liability for the cleanup of hazardous wastes, the man-
agement of Alaska lands, and to address numerous other topics. 
Since then, lame duck Congresses have approved NAFfA in 
1994, impeached President Clinton in 1998, and created the De-
partment of Homeland Security in 2002.72 
No constitutional change has ever addressed the power of 
the President to act during a lame duck period. Unconstrained, 
lame duck Presidents have entered into binding international ob-
ligations, such as the Algiers Declarations that secured the re-
lease of the Iranian hostages moments before President Carter 
69. John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
470,480-81 (1997) (quoting Representative Sumners). 
70. !d. at 479. 
71. !d. at 477-78. 
72 See id. at 490-93 (describing the actions of lame duck Congresses in 1980 and 
1994); RICHARDS. BETH & RICHARD C. SACHS, LAME DUCK SESSIONS, 74TH-106TH 
CONGRESS (1935-2000) (2000) (Congressional Research Service report summarizing the 
history of lame duck congressional sessions from 1935 to 2000). 
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was succeeded by President Reagan in January 1981.73 They 
have also issued controversial pardons, including President 
Bush's December 1992 decision to pardon former Secretary of 
Defense Casper Weinberger shortly before Weinberger faced 
trial for actions related to the Iran-Contra affair.74 Since the en-
actment of the twentieth amendment, it appears that only one 
federal judge has been nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate in the lame duck period beginning with 
election day and ending with the inauguration of the new Presi-
dent. Stephen Breyer had been serving as the Democratic major-
ity counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee when the No-
vember 1980 election produced a Republican President and a 
new Republican majority in the Senate. A few days later, Presi-
dent Carter nominated Breyer to a position on the First Circuit, 
which the Senate confirmed with little opposition.75 
President Clinton was constitutionally barred from seeking 
reelection in 2000, but he kept busy throughout his lame duck 
period. He signed the treaty establishing an international crimi-
nal court, an action that Senator Helms decried as a "blatant at-
tempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands of his succes-
sor. "76 He employed his powers under the Antiquities Act to 
designate six new national monuments comprising over 600,000 
acres of land, thrilling environmentalists but sometimes infuriat-
ing local officials.77 The Clinton Administration also issued a 
73. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeni: Presidential Transi-
tions and International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303 (2001). Combs, besides recounting the 
resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, provides an excellent description of the actions of 
other lame-duck Presidents before then. See id. at 329-36. 
74. See Stephen L. Carter, The !ran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 Hous. L. REV. 883 
(1992). 
75. Three other judicial nominations come close to, but outside of, my description 
of the lame duck appointment of judges. In June 1968, President Johnson nominated Jus-
tice Fortas to serve as Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
Johnson had decided not to run for reelection, but the election of his successor had yet to 
take place. In any event, the Senate refused to confirm Fortas. In December 2000, Presi-
dent Clinton made a recess appointment of Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit. That 
appointment would have expired after one year, but Judge Gregory was one of President 
Bush's first group of judicial nominees in May 2001, and the Senate approved that ap-
pointment soon thereafter. Most recently, the Senate confirmed Michael McConnell's 
nomination to the Tenth Circuit during its November 2002 lame duck session, but Presi-
dent Bush had nominated McConnell long before the lame duck session occurred. 
76. Ruth Wedgwood, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The 
Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 196 (2001) (quoting Senator 
Helms). See also Combs, supra note 73, at 429 (explaining that President Clinton could 
not defer a decision about the treaty because it "was open for signature without prior 
ratification only until December 31, 2001 "). 
77. See Sanjay Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Eco-
systems with the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 537 (2001) (listing the 
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number of other controversial environmental regulations, in-
cluding several promulgated on its last day in office. For exam-
ple, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a new rule re-
ducing the permitted level of arsenic in drinking water.78 That 
common sense action had been debated for well over a decade, 
but it had been protested by western states with high naturally 
occurring levels of arsenic that would necessitate extensive and 
purportedly unnecessary municipal expenditures. After years of 
political wrangling but no changes, in the summer of 2000 the 
Clinton Administration proposed that the arsenic standard be 
changed to 5 parts per billion (ppb ). That proposal elicited howls 
of protest from communities that would incur substantial costs to 
meet new standards. Albuquerque, with an average arsenic level 
of 13 ppb, was the largest city that would violate the proposed 
standards, and city officials, led by Democratic Mayor Jim Baca, 
were outspoken in their opposition to the suggested changes. 
Vice President Gore was conspicuously silent about the pending 
new arsenic regulations during the summer's presidential cam-
paign, a sharp contrast to his claim four years before that Repub-
licans in Congress were in favor of more arsenic. Gore won New 
Mexico by 366 votes, the closest vote of any state in the nation. 
Only after the election was settled, and just before it left office, 
did the Clinton Administration settle on a 10 ppb standard for 
arsenic in drinking water. The Bush Administration soon an-
nounced that it would revisit the rule, a decision which gener-
ated lots of unfavorable publicity for the environmental creden-
tials of the new president, who soon decided to maintain the 
standard adopted at the end of the Clinton Administration. 
President Clinton also issued a number of controversial 
pardons in his last days in office. As Greg Sisk has recounted, in 
January 2001 a lame duck Clinton granted pardons to his 
brother, a participant in the Whitewater scandal, a wealthy busi-
nessman who was facing a new federal criminal investigation, 
and a cocaine dealer whose father was a major contributor to the 
Democratic party. Clinton granted executive clemency to 
Patricia Hearst and two members of the Weather Underground, 
not realizing of course the terrible prominence that domestic ter-
rorism would gain eight months later. Clinton's most controver-
new monuments); see also id. at 575 (citing national monuments established by lame 
duck Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, and Dwight Eisenhower). 
78. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, Part VIII, 66 Fed. Reg. 6,976 
(2001). 
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sial pardon went to Marc Rich, a "billionaire fugitive" and "an 
accused black marketeer who traded with the enemy-an act of 
treason."79 The insider's account of the pardons reveals much the 
same frenzy of activity that resulted in the appointment of Wil-
liam Marburlo and the infamous Midnight Judges exactly 200 
years before. 0 
The lame duck problem occurs in the states, too. One of the 
most dramatic examples of that occurred on the eve of Mar-
bury's two hundredth birthday, when Illinois Governor Ryan 
gained international attention for pardoning four death row in-
mates and commuting the death sentences of the other 164 pris-
oners awaiting capital punishment in the state. The merits of that 
decision provoked widespread commentary tracking the na-
tional-and international-debate about the wisdom and just 
application of the death penalty. But the timing of Governor 
Ryan's actions caused concern independent of the merits of the 
more general debate regarding capital punishment. Ryan acted 
on January 11,2003, just two days before Rod Blagojevich would 
replace him as governor. Blagojevich characterized Ryan's ac-
tions as "a big mistake. "81 Peter Roskam, a Republican state 
senator who had been pushing for legislative reforms of capital 
punishment, worried that "[t]he desire to reform the system will 
be dulled" by Ryan's actions.82 The Chicago Tribune agreed, 
having editorialized that Ryan would "vastly undermine his own 
reform efforts" by issuing a blanket commutation in his last days 
in office.83 But the Tribune had also written one day before 
Ryan's action that "it would not be surprisin~ if Ryan reaches 
for the most dramatic statement he can make." 
79. Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presi· 
dential Term, 67 Mo. L. REV. 13, 14·15 (2002). 
80. See President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons: Hearing Before the Senate Judi· 
ciary Comm., 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (2001) (testimony of Eric M. Holder, Jr., former 
Deputy Attorney General) (describing how "extremely busy" the last day of the Clinton 
Administration was in the Justice Department). Even so, the timing of Clinton's actions 
are not as troubling as the handiwork of John Adams. Clinton was constitutionally 
barred from seeking reelection; Adams ran and lost, providing unimpeachable evidence 
of a popular rejection of him. Moreover, AI Gore-the candidate of the Democratic 
Party that had previously nominated Clinton-received more popular votes in defeat 
than did the winner, George W. Bush. The popular rejection of John Adams was thus 
more convincing, but the problems attendant to lame ducks were seen in Clinton none· 
thelcss. 
81. Christi Parsons, Capital Justice Challenges Go to Hands of Others, On. TRIB., 
Jan. 12,2003 at 17 (quoting Blagojevich). 
82. /d. (quoting Senator Roskam). 
83. Decision Time on Death Row, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,2003, at 20. 
84. /d. 
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Within Illinois, Ryan's lame duck appointments provoked 
unqualified outrage. Ryan had announced in August 2001 that 
he would not seek reelection, presumably because he was impli-
cated in a patronage scandal involving his previous tenure as Il-
linois Secretary of State. Democrat Rod Blagojevich defeated 
Republican Jim Ryan in the November 2002 election after both 
candidates had worked to distance themselves from the incum-
bent governor. The Republicans lost their control of the state 
senate as a result of the election as well. After the election, Gov-
ernor Ryan made over 200 appointments to various state offices. 
Many of those appointments went to friends who had remained 
loyal to him during his time in office. Those appointed included 
Ryan's legal counsel and his communications chief, the es-
tranged wife of Ryan's former chief of staff, and Republican leg-
islators who had lost their bids for reelection. The offices thus 
filled included positions on the Illinois Pollution Control Board, 
the Chicago Transit Authority board, the Educational Labor 
Board, the Illinois Industrial Commission, the Illinois Racing 
Board, and the deputy commissioner to the Office of Banks and 
Real Estate.85 Moreover, "[i]n a complicated maneuver repeated 
dozens of times, some workers already in the middle of 4-year 
appointments abruptly moved out of their terms and into new 4-
year terms during Ryan's final months in office. The new terms 
were aimed at giving the workers job security deep into 2006-
well into the 4-year term the voters gave Blagojevich in Novem-
ber."86 Blagojevich and his supporters pleaded with Ryan not to 
continue. As Blagojevich's spokesman explained, "we don't 
want people serving in jobs when they are not in agreement with 
the governor's new agenda to move the state forward."87 An-
other Democrat complained that "[w]e are tying the hands of the 
future governor with too many appointees by a lame duck. "88 
The Chicago Tribune editorialized that Ryan had been "stuffing 
nearly everyone who's ever said 'hello' to him into a high-paying 
state job," making "personnel moves so shameless that prior 
85. See Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Ryan Keeps Handing Out State Jobs; Blago-
jevich Considers Lawsuit as Governor Gives Shaw, Longtime Aide New Posts, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 7, 2003, at 1 (listing more than a dozen of the appointments). 
86. John Chase & Ray Long, 28 Pals Fall in Job Purge; Blagojevich Risks Democ-
rats' Ire, CHI. TRIB, Jan. 28, 2003, Section 2 at 1. 
87. Long & Parsons, supra note 85, at 1 (quoting Bagojevich spokesman Doug 
Scofield). 
88. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Ryan Has Parting Gifts for his Pals; Governor 
Giving Jobs to Buddies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2002, at 1 (quoting Senator Vince De-
muzio). 
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lame-duck governors look like saintly pillars of restraint."89 Ryan 
responded simply that "there were vacancies there, and they 
should be filled. "90 Indeed: one position had been vacant for 
over eight years.91 The state senate approved the nominations 
with surprisingly little protest from Senate Democrats. Carol 
Ronen of Chicago was the one Senator to speak against confirm-
ing Ryan's nominees, insisting that "[t]hese 11th-hour, last-
minute decisions by a lame-duck governor are going to impact 
public policy and the budget of the state of Illinois years beyond 
the term of our new governor-elect, and I think that's just plain 
wrong."92 Senator Ronen added that "[o]n Nov. 5, the voters of 
Illinois clearly said they wanted change. What we are doing to-
day is not only in opposition to that change peogle wanted but is 
the clear indication of why we need change." As soon as he 
took office, Governor Blagojevich rescinded more than sixty of 
Ryan's appointments, but many of the appointments could not 
be undone because they had been approved for specific terms in 
office. And some Democrats in the Senate actually complained 
about Blagojevich's actions.94 
III. THE SOLUTION FOR LAME DUCKS 
The problem revealed in each of these episodes is that the 
actions of lame duck executives and legislators occur after the 
electorate exercises its constitutional opportunity to ensure the 
accountability of their government leaders.95 The solution must 
be to deny or cabin those governmental powers that can tend to 
be abused during lame duck periods. I will sketch a tentative ap-
proach to that solution in this essay, recognizing that much more 
work remains to be done. 
89. Ryan's Cronies-and Real Reform, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 9, 2003, at 16. 
90. Long & Parsons, supra note 85, at 1 (quoting Ryan spokesman Ray Serati). 
91. !d. (reporting that a former state legislator had accepted a top position in the 
state Department of Natural Resources that had been vacant since 1994). 
92. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, Stop Buddy Plan, Ryan Asked; Blagojevich Says 
Governor to Comply, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2002, at 1 (quoting Senator Ron en). 
93. Ray Long & Christi Parsons, "Pate" Leaves Like a Good Soldier; Ryan is Re-
buffed on Office Deal to Aid Old Friend, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, at 1 (quoting Senator 
Ronen). 
94. See Chase & Long, supra note 86, at 1. 
95 .. State court judges can be lame ducks, too, when their terms are about to expire 
and their successors have been chosen. For an example of how decisionmaking by lame 
duck judges can be controversial, see Chavez v. Hockenhull, 39 N.M. 79, 39 P.2d 1027 
(1934) (resolving a disputed election to the United States Senate in favor of the Republi-
can candidate on the day before the Republican majority on the state supreme court 
ended). 
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The first task is to identify a lame duck. That proves more 
difficult than one might initially suspect. At least four possible 
definitions of a lame duck present themselves for consideration: 
(1) a government official who cannot obtain an additional term; 
(2) a government official who has publicly announced that he or 
she will not seek an additional term; (3) a government official 
who fails to win on election day; and ( 4) and a government offi-
cial whose successor has been formally chosen. Alternative one 
is greatly overbroad for it would treat every official subject to 
term limits as a lame duck once they reach their last constitu-
tionally permitted term. It would, for example, mean that every 
governor of Virginia is always a lame duck, for state law prohib-
its a governor from serving more than one term.96 Alternative 
two has some currency from popular usage.97 But it, too, is over-
broad, for it would render numerous officials lame ducks while 
they have months or years left to serve. To cite one current ex-
ample, Georgia Senator Zell Miller's announcement that he will 
not seek reelection made him a lame duck in this sense even 
though his term extends for another 23 months. Alternative four, 
by contrast, is too narrow insofar as it makes the characteriza-
tion of a lame duck depend upon the happenstance of a close 
election or a constitutional formality even though the voters 
have spoken. That leaves alternative three, which properly fo-
cuses upon both the voice of the electorate and the status of the 
outgoing official. Ordinarily, then, a President becomes a lame 
duck on the night of election day once it is apparent that he has 
not been reelected. That was even true of President Clinton after 
election day in November 2001, for we knew that he was not go-
ing to be reelected even though it took several weeks to resolve 
the battle between George W. Bush and Al Gore. For President 
Adams, the requisite date was probably December 12, when 
word of Jefferson's victory over Adams in South Carolina pro-
vided Jefferson and Burr with sufficient electoral votes to doom 
Adams's bid for reelection.98 Thus the historian who casually 
96. See VA. CON ST. art. V, § 1 (2002). 
97. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 215 (2002) (writing that 
"[a] lame-duck Lyndon Johnson had nominated Abe Fortas" as Chief Justice in the 
summer of 1968); Rick Pearson, Snowballing Scandal Blurs Ryan's Future; Some Already 
Doubt a 2nd Term, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, Section 4 at 1 (reference to Governor Ryan 
as lame duck nearly two years before his term ended). 
98. As recounted above, Jefferson cited the December 12 date as dispositive be-
cause it was then that "the event of the S.C. election which decided the Presidential elec-
tion was known at Washington." 2 SCHACHNER, supra note 38, at 670-71 (quoting Jeffer-
son). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge, Dec. 18, 1800, in 9 
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remarked that Adams was "not yet a lame duck" on November 
22 was correct according to my understanding.99 
This definition of a lame duck also furthers the accountabil-
ity that elections are designed to achieve. A candidate for reelec-
tion possesses a powerful incentive not to act in a manner that 
offends the electorate. It is unlikely that any of the acts of Presi-
dent Adams or the lame duck Federalist Congress would have 
changed the minds of many voters, though the closeness of the 
election of 1800 counsels caution in simply assuming that is so. 
More recent lame ducks better illustrate the accountability con-
cern. Stephen Carter, for example, observed that lame duck 
President Bush's pardon of Casper Weinberger occurred after 
Bush would "have faced the judgment of the American People 
on his action. "100 President Clinton's pardons could have dam-
aged the candidacy of AI Gore, and the post-election environ-
mental regulations might have cost Gore New Mexico while af-
fecting local congressional races. Governor Ryan, by contrast, 
was already oblivious to such electoral constraints because he 
did not seem to care who succeeded him in office, or even about 
public opinion itself.101 
However defined, lame ducks have their champions. During 
the debate on the twentieth amendment, lame ducks were de-
fended "as worthy legislators even if the people had decided to 
replace them .... Lame-duck members were also praised as in-
dependent from partisan and popular demands. They were seen 
as deserving of the opportunity to finish their legislative agenda, 
to counsel their replacements, and to make the transition back to 
private life. The lame-duck period was glamorized as a necessary 
coolin~;:-off period during which electoral passions could sub-
side."1 2 Seventy years later, Governor Ryan was characterized 
as "refreshing" for his "blunt talk" about the perceived failures 
of the state legislature, with one writer even remarking that its 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 157 (writing that "[bjefore you 
receive this, you will have understood that the State of S Carolina (the only one about 
which there was uncertainty) has given a republican vote"); Letter from Thomas Jeffer· 
son to James Madison, Dec. 19, 1800, in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra 
note 22, at 157·58 (writing that "[t]he election inS Carolina has in some measure decided 
the great contest"). 
99. SMITH, supra note 10, at 277. 
100. Carter, supra note 74, at 887. 
101. See Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Illinois' Leadership Turns the Page; History-
and Federal Prosecutors- Will Write Final Chapter in How Ryan is Remembered, CHI. 
TRIB, Jan. 13, 2003 (observing that "[a]s his political career disintegrated, Ryan gave up 
worrying about how he was perceived by the voters who had soured on him"). 
102. Nagle, supra note 69, at 482. 
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"[t]oo bad there's not some way that we could always have a 
scandal-plagued, lame-duck political pariah in the governor's 
mansion telling it like it is."10 Further, Paul Finkelman has sug-
gested that the lame duck period might be the "best time" for a 
President to consider pardons because of the absence of political 
pressures.104 But all of these claims are deeply problematic. They 
presume that accountability to the electorate is an obstacle to 
desirable public policy, rather than its sine qua non. The Consti-
tution presumes that the regular exercise of the electoral fran-
chise by the people is central to self government. Defenses of 
lame ducks thus deny "the end that government may be respon-
sive to the will of the people. "105 
My proposal, then, is that lame ducks should be denied the 
power to take any irrevocable acts. The issuance of pardons and 
the signing of binding international obligations fall within this 
category.106 Likewise, lame duck Presidents and governors 
should not be able to make appointments that cannot be unilat-
erally revoked by their successors. In Jefferson's words, that 
power should be denied "because appointments in the nature of 
freehold render it difficult to undo what is done."107 Judges serv-
ing with life tenure are the most obvious example, but agency 
appointees who serve for specified terms and who cannot be re-
moved at will qualify as well. It is difficult to conceive of the ob-
jection to this approach. Any office that is already vacant on 
election day can remain so-or can be filled by an acting offi-
cial-until the newly elected executive takes office. Any office 
that becomes vacant after election day can await the new execu-
tive as well, save perhaps in the unimaginable circumstance of 
multiple, important offices becoming vacant simultaneously.108 
Any office that itself is created during the lame duck period 
103. Eric Zorn, News in June Offers Plenty of Ups and Downs, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 
2002, at 16. 
104. See Sisk, supra note 79, at 23-24 (quoting an e-mail from Professor Finkelman). 
105. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
106. See Combs, supra note 73, at 331 & n.116 (citing cases in which "incoming gov-
ernors George Voinovich and Lamar Alexander, of Ohio and Tennessee, respectively, 
filed lawsuits to invalidate their predecessors' lame-duck commutations of death sen-
tences, commutations that the states' voters vehemently opposed," but which the courts 
upheld). 
107. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 26, 1800, in 9 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 161. 
108. Cf Paul Taylor, Alternatives to a Constitutional Amendment: How Congress 
May Provide for the Quick, Temporary Filling of House Member Seats in Emergencies by 
Statute, 10 J.L. & PoL'Y 373 (2002). 
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must of course await the new executive, as Jefferson's plight so 
vividly demonstrates. 
That leaves a host of executive actions that can be revoked, 
but only by the expenditure of substantial political capital. Ad-
ministrative regulations like the environmental rules approved 
by President Clinton in January 2001 provide one good illustra-
tion, as the arsenic dispute attests. Governor Ryan's appoint-
ments to various government offices are another. In Jefferson's 
words, the executive should not have to "encounter the odium of 
putting others in their places."109 Yet the government cannot 
come to a complete halt during a lame duck period. Indictments 
must be filed to comply with speedy trial guarantees, regulations 
must be finalized consistent with administrative law, briefs must 
be served pursuant to court deadlines-and the President or 
state governor retains authority over these and many other im-
portant decisions, whenever they occur. The government, in 
short, must go on. But the lame duck period should not be seen 
as a license to reward friends, punish enemies, or frustrate the 
incoming officials whom the people have elected. At the very 
least, lame duck executives should heed Jefferson's admonition 
not to be "personally unkind."110 
Lame duck legislatures present a different challenge. Again, 
it is difficult to understand why legislation that could not be en-
acted before election day suddenly becomes so urgent immedi-
ately thereafter. Yet it is easier to imagine a crisis developing for 
which a rapid legislative response is necessary. I would allow for 
such legislation, while blocking strategic lawmaking like the Ju-
diciary Act of 1801 and the District of Columbia courts act. Both 
goals could be achieved by requiring a two-thirds supermajority 
for any bills that are considered by the legislature during the 
lame duck period. As John McGinnis and Mike Rappaport have 
argued, legislative supermajority rules "may promote a more 
harmonious political existence by making it harder for interest 
groups to acquire other people's resources for themselves."111 
Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport describe such rules "as the 
first drafts of a blueprint to restore the Framers' vision of a lim-
ited government."112 The case for a limited government is all the 
more compelling during a lame duck period. It is the rare law 
109. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, supra note 1. 
110. /d. 
111. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitu-
tional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365,372 (1999). 
112. /d. at 372. 
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that was not sufficiently important for the legislature to enact be-
fore an election but which is so important that it must be enacted 
before the new legislature takes office. And when such a law ex-
ists, the requisite supermajority of the lame duck legislature can 
approve it.113 
The ultimate solution to the lame duck problem is to elimi-
nate the lame duck period. Altogether. We tried to do that once, 
but the framers of the twentieth amendment failed to account 
for the governmental business that can be done between election 
day in November and inauguration day in January. The original 
reasons for the delay between an election and its effectiveness-
to wit, the time it takes to learn about the results of the election 
and for the new officials to travel to the seat of government-
have long been obsolete. The election of 1800 has already 
yielded one constitutional amendment in response to the tie vote 
between Jefferson and Burr; another amendment could prevent 
the recurrence of the events that divided Jefferson and Adams. 
So the best birthday present that I can suggest is to eliminate the 
lame ducks that produced William Marbury's appointment, and 
Marbury v. Madison, once and for all. 
113. An alternative solution is suggested by a North Carolina statute that "prohibits 
lame-duck votes in the month after a [city] council election." Stephen C. Keady, Recent 
Developments, Into rhe Danger Zone: Massey v. Cicy of Char/orte and rhe Fare of Condi-
cional Zoning in Norrh Carolina, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1155, 1159 n.25 (2001). 
